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THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS ON WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION.
The Safety Appliance Acts' impose an absolute duty upon all rail-
roads engaged in interstate commerce to use and keep in repair certain
specified equipment on their rolling stock, and. provide a penalty for
each violation. No right of .action for personal injuries arising out
of a breach of such duty is expressly given by the terms of the statute,
but it is provided that assumption of risk shall be no longer available
as a defence, and that the imposition of the penalty shall not be con-
strued to relieve the carrier from liability in any remedial action for
the death or injury of a railroad employee. Is the implication of a
specific common-law remedy for personal injuries so irresistible that
we must conclude that a state is unable to substitute a remedy under
the workmen's compensation act for an employee engaged in a purely
'Act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531), amended by Act of March 2, 1903(32 Stat. at L. 943) ; supplemented by Act of April 14, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 299).
[732]
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intrastate employment? The New York Court of Appeals has recently
answered this question in the affirmative in the case of Ward v. Erie
Ry. '(1921) 23o N. Y. 230, 129 N. E. 886. The question is almost one
of first impression. The Circuit Court of Appeals has given the same
answer in a brief decision without any discussion of the authorities,2
and this decision has since been approved in a dictum by another
federal judge.8
It is important, in the determinatioi of this question, to note that
this statute preceded even -the Federal -Employers' Liability Act, the
forerunner of all state compensation acts, and that, therefore, the
attention of Congress could not have been directed to the necessity of
specifying any particular form of remedial action. Is it not likely that
Congress intended merely to render unavailing the defences referred
to in the statute without prescribing any remedy? If we disregard the
decisions referred to above, the common-law right of railroad em-
ployees to damages for personal injuries received in the course of their
employment. is completely abrogated in the great majority of states.
Those engaged in interstate commerce come within the purview of the
Employers' Liability Act, while those doing intrastate work are covered
by the workmen's compensation acts. According to the modern view
that common-law actions for personal injuries between master and
servant are not suited to the times, and that some form of industrial
insurance is far superior, this result is highly desirable; and the
Supreme Couirt has held that the New York Compensation Act is a
very excellent substitute.4 But if, on the other hand, these decisions
are allowed to stand, we have driven a wedge between the two pre-
vailing systems of compensation, and the common-law action, having
been once exiled, creeps in again. The result is unfair and tends to
discrimination and inequality among railroad men, for the interstate
employee must be content with his compensation, while the intrastate
employee may elect either to take compensation or to sue for damages.
Surely, we should adopt the view that is most consistent with modern
development, unless we are precluded from doing so by the authorities.-
The expressed intention of the Safety Appliance Acts is to preserve
the safety of travellers and employees. Irrespective of "the express
provisions of the statute, we need have no difficulty in determining
'Ross v. Schooley (igig, C. C. A. 7th) 257 Fed. 290.
'Director General of Railroads v. Ronald (I92O, C. C. A. 2d) 265 Fed. 138, 144.
' N. Y. Central Ry. v. White (1917) 243 U. S. 188, 201, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 252, per
Pitney, J.: "The statute under consideration sets aside one body of' rules only to
establish another system in its place .... Instead of assuming the entire con-
sequences of all ordinary risks of the occupation, he assumed the consequences,
in excess of the scheduled compensation, of risks ordinary and extraordinary."
'Knowlton v. Moore (igoo) 178 U. S. 41, 77, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 761, per White, J.:
"We are . . . bound to give heed to the rule, that where a particular construction
of a statute will occasion great inconvenience or produce inequality and injustice,-
that view is to be avoided if another and more reasonable interpretation is present
in the statute."
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that a right of action is given to an injured employee, for it is elemen-
tary law that a member of the class for whose benefit a statute has
been enacted has a right of action against an offender for the damages
sustained through a breach of the statutory duty. The Supreme Court
of the United States has ruled that this statute applies to all interstate
railroad equipment, whether engaged in interstate commerce or not,
and that even intrastate employees may recover damages in a remedial
action under the Act.6 The Court's language, construed broadly,
might sustain the contention of the New York court, but we must
remember that the question in that case was whether or not the
employee should have any remedy at all, and did not involve statutory
changes in the common law.
By what law is the remedy to be determined? It is said7 that-it
must be by the law existing at the time of the enactment of the statute.
It is submitted that this is not correct. While, in matters exclusively
under federal control, we may say that there is a common law of the
United States," still, generally speaking, there is no national common
law, and the federal courts apply the law of the locality as modified by
state and federal statutes.9 The power of Congress- must include
authority to deal with a host of acts, not interstate commerce in and
of themselves, because of their relation to and influence upon interstate
commerce.10 But the failure of Congress to legislate can be construed
only as an intention n6t to disturb what already exists, and is the mode
by which-it adopts, for cases within the scope of its power, the rules of
the state law. 1 Should we say that Congress has here entered the field
and prescribed the remedy? Had a specific remedy been given, we
must have admitted that that remedy could not be altered or impaired
by a state ;12 and, when it can be readily implied that Congress intended
to assume absolute control, a state may not interfere.1 3  But, through
a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has held that Congress, in
'Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby (1916) 241 U. S. 33, 41, 36 Sup. Ct. 842, per
Pitney, J.: "Without the express leave of Congress, it is not possible, while the
Federal legislation stands, for ,the States to make or enforce inconsistent laws
giving redress for injuries to workmen or travellers occasioned by the absence or
insecurity of such safety devices."
' I. e. in the principal case.
"Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1894, N. D. Iowa) 62 Fed. 24, 42.
'Smith v. Alabama (1888) 124 U. S. 465, 478, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 569, per Matthews,
J.: "There is no common law of the United States, in the sense of a national
customary law, distinct from the common law of England as adopted by the
several States each for itself, applied as -its local law, and subject to such altera-
tion as may be provided by its own statutes."
10 United States v. Ferger (i919) 250 U. S. I99,'39 Sup. Ct. 445.
Smith v'. Alabama, supra note 9, at p. 477.
N. Y. Central Ry. v. Tonsellito (1917) 244 U. S. 36o, 362, 37 Sup. Ct. 629, 621,
per McReynolds, J.: "Congress having declared when, how far, and to whom
carriers shall be liable on account of accidents in the specified class, -such liability
can neither be extended nor abridged by common or statutory laws of the State."
"Postal Tel. Co. v. Warren (1919) 251 U. S. 27, 4o Sup. Ct. 69.
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legislating upon a particular subject of interstate commerce, will not
be held to have inhibited by implication the exercise by the states of
their reserved police power, unless such state action would actually
frustrate or impair the intended operation of the federal legislation
14
The compensatipn,of injured employees is certainly primarily a matter
for state regulation. 5 The fact that interstate commerce is incidentally
affected is immaterial.' 8 And how can it be said that the substitution
of compensation for common-law damages will impair the operation
of the statute? The federal case supporting the principal case"T
answers that uniformity in railroad law is essential, and that the
liability to pay damages is a spur to the observance of the duty imposed;
As to the first reason, the actual 'necessity is very doubtful,1
8 and, as
to the second, Congress seems not to have thought it of controlling
importance when it enacted the Employers' Liability Act.
"Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber (1898) I69 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct 488 (The
Federal Animal Industry Act, making it a misdemeanor to transport cattle known
to be diseased, did not prevent a state from imposing a civil liability for damages
sustained by owners of domestic cattle by reason of such importation) ; Reid v.
Colorado (ipon) 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. 92 (The same Act did not prevent
the states from penalizing the importation of cattle without inspection by state
officials); Savage v. Jones (1912) 225 U. S. 501, 32 Sup. Ct. 715 (The Federal
Food and Drugs Act, prohibiting misbranding, did not prevent the states fiom
requiring to be affixed a statement of ingredients); Atlantic Coast Line Ry. 'v.
Georgia (914) 234 U. S. 280, 34 Sup. Ct. 829 (The Federal Safety Appliance
Acts, dealing with the equipment of locomotives and cars, did not preclude the
states from legislating concerning locomdtiLe headlights, as to which Congress,
had not specifically acted).
In Missouri, K. & -T. Ry. v. Haber, supra, Harlan, J., says: "This question
must of course be determined with reference to the settled rule that a statute
enacted in execution of a reserved power of the State is not to be regarded as
inconsistent with an act of Congress . . . unless the repugnance or conflict is so
direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together."
And in Savage v..Jones, supra, Hughes, J., says: "But the intent to supersede
the exercise by the State of its police power as to matters not covered by the
Federal legiilation'. . . is not to be. implied unless the act of Congress fairly
interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the State."15N. Y. Central Ry. v. White, supra note 4.
Pennsylvania Ry. v. Hughes (1903) 19, U. S. 477, 488, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 135:
"It is well settled that the State may mae valid enactments in the exercise of
its legislative power to promote the welfare and convenience of its citizens,
although in theirloperation they may have an effect upon interstate traffic."
T Ross v. Schooley, supra note 2.
"
8
"The subject of compensation for accidents in industry is one peculiarly ap-
propriate for state legislation. There must, necessarily, be great diversity in the
conditions of living and in the needs of the injured and of his dependents, accord-
ing to whether they reside in one or the' otier of our States and Territories,
so widely extended,. . . The field of compensation for injuries appears to be
one in which uniformity is not desirable or at least not essential to the public
welfare."' Brandeis, J., dissenting, in N. Y. Central Ry. v. Winfield (1917) 244
U. S. x47, 168, 37 Sup. Ct 546, 555.
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PRESENT DAY LABOR LITIGATION-STATUTES
Considerable adverse criticism has-been directed at the courts for
legislating judicially. Whether this criticism is warranted or not is
not material to this discussion, but certainly the history and develop-
ment of labor litigation is for the most part a chronicle of such judicial
legislation. The legislatures, it is true, have helped to a considerable
degree; yet it is the judiciary that has faced most of the problems and
has paved the way -for our present rules. The task of the legislatures
seems to have'been to put many of these rules into statutory form, and
also to bring about more or less uniformity between the law of the vari-
ous jurisdictions. Few rules have taken statutory form that had not
alread r been adopted by the courts in some jurisdiction, and thus the
effect has often been simply to give legislative sanction to that which the
courts had already formulated. Naturally, however, the legislatures
have introduced several new features, and will probably continue to
do so to a greater extent in the future, while continuing their task of
settling points upon which there is now conflict in the judicial decisions.'
One of the first and most natural things for the legislatures to under-
take was to establish the unions upon a legal basis. The courts of this
country had .refused to accept the English view that combinations of
workmen were illegal conspiracies, and had not only refused to declare
such associations unlawful, but had also declined to enjoin strikes for
better wages and working conditions, etc.2  This privilege of organiz-
'The reasons for this hesitancy of the legislatures is merely an incident in the
political history of the United States. It is well realized that until recently the
legislatures have been mostly dominated by certain political groups, with a result
that progressive economic legislation has" been obtained only through unusual
effort. Fbrtunately this power has been overthrown generally and results are to
be expected, although questions involving industrial relations are seemingly
avoided by the legislatures whenever possible. Indeed it should not be overlooked
that, in not a few instances, the labor unions have used their great power to pro-
cure special legislation which tends to benefit labor at the expense of the common
weal. Many would consider .the Adamson Act as an instance of such undesir-
able special legislation. It is believed, however, that the natural conservatism of
the people will, in the long run, serve as an effectual check on our legislatures.
'Originally, of course, a combination of workmen was illegal in England, and
it was not until 1825 that the earlier English statutes prohibiting such combina-
tions were repealed. 6 Geo. IV, c. 129. Before such repeal, however, it was
necessary for the American courts to decide whether or not they would adopt
these rules, which had been in existence since feudal times.. To their credit it
can be said that the almost unanimous decision was that such rules would work
great hardship upon the people and were unsuited to this country, and conse-
quently combinations of laborers were recognized as legal. The origin of the
English rules was explained in State v. Stewart (887) 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559,
where the court says: "The early English statutes, beginning with the middle of
the fourteenth century, are to be read in the light of the civilization of that day,
and their provisions, to -us of the nineteenth century, harsh, illiberal and tyran-
nical, were but the reflex of the prevalent notions of class distinctions, that
shaped and guided the social and political polity of those days." Chief Justice
Shaw in Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842, Mass.) 4 Metc. iii, says: "All those
laws of the parent country, whether rules of the common law, or early English
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ing has -now been expressly granted by statute in many states,$ while
in others it has been impliedly recognized by legislation .enacted to
protect some feature of unionism.4 This question of the legality of
a union, however, is of but little more than academic importance, for
although it is frequently discussed, there are practically no decisions
in this country holding unions to be illegal as such. The really
important problem before our courts and legislatures has been to deter-
mine what are the rights and privileges of the groups involved in labor
disputes, while acting collectively. Preceding comments5 have
attempted to make a short review and classification of the rules estab-
lished by the courts to govern this' industrial relationship, and the
present discussion is concerned with the effect of statutory regulations
on this subject.
While the legislatures, as already suggested, have enacted many of
the rules already put in force-by some of the courts, yet there are
important statutory changes. One of the changes attempted was to
prevent the 'employer from discrimiiating between union and non-
union men, either in hiring them or in continuing them in employment.
6
statutes, which were made for the purpose of regulating the wages of laborers,....
not being adapted to the circumstances of our colonial condition, were not
adopted, used, or apiproved, and therefore do not come within the description of
the laws adopted and confirmed by the provision of the coristitution already
cited." in the two states that did accept the English rule, the position was
quickly abandoned and they now have statutes expressly legalizing such organi-
zations. Pa. Laws 1869, ch. 1242, sec. i, applied in Cote v. Murphy (1894) 159 Pa.
42o, 28 Atl. 190; 3 N. Y. Cons. Laws igog, ch. 88, sec. 43.
'The Pennsylvania statute, supra note 2, declares that "it shall be lawful for
any and all classes of mechanics, journeymen, tradesmen and laborers to form
societies and associations for their mutual aid, benefit and protection, and peace-
ably to meet, discuss and establish all necessary by-laws, rules, etc." Shortly
afterwards it was enacted that a refusal was not indictable as a conspiracy. Pa.
Laws 1872, ch. 1105, sec. I; see 3 N. J. Comp. Stat. igio, ch. 128; Minn. Laws
1917, ch. 493, sec. i; Wash. Laws, i919, ch. 185; Wis. Laws i9i9, ch. 211.
"'If, as we think, the statute expressly creates or recognizes the right of trade
unions to be protected in the use of labels for trade union purposes, the sugges-
tion that the association represented-by the plaintiff is an unlawful association'
falls of itself." Tracy v. Banker (1897) 170 Mass. 266, 49 N. E. 308. A later
decision by this court puts the privilege of organization on a constitutional basis,
as has been done in several jurisdictions. "The right of laborers to organize
unions and to utilize such organizations by instituting a strike is an exercise of
the common-law right of every citizen to pursue his calling, whether of labor or
business, as he in his judgment thinks fit .... This common-law right was
raised to the dignity of a constitutional right by being incorporated in the Con-
stitution of-the Commonwealth. . . In article i of the Declaration of Rights
it is declared that 'all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural,
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of . . .
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtain-
ing their safety and happiness.' It is in the exercise of this right that laborers
can legally combine together in what are called labor unions." Pickett v. Walsh
(i9o6) 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753.
'COMMENTS (92) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280, 404, 5oi, 618.
'These statutes provided that an employer should not "require any employee,
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These statutes have been unavailing because they were held to conflict
with constitutional provisions.7 Such discrimination, therefore, still
may exist. The desirability of eliminating it will not be discussed,
except to point out that the legal privilege to discriminate can be taken
away only through constitutional amendment.
Enactments exist in most states to the effect that no one. shall inter-
fere by force or violence with the employment of another.6 This, of
course, is merely declaratory of what has always been the law on this
matter. Some statutes also expressly forbid threats of injury to prop-
erty or of bodily harm.9 The North Dakota statute applies to any
one who "maliciously interferes". 10  The legislatures could be of great
service, however, by definitely stating what shall be the law on those
matters in which the courts are in conflict and in which there is con-
siderable agitation for a change. A familiar example of this is the
boycott, which has been expressly declared illegal by statute in several
states." Another question which seems far from. being setLed 'is
whether or not picketing shall be considered legal. Some few statutes
expressly prohibit it in any form,12 while others have declared peaceful
picketing to be lawful.'8 It is in matters of this kind that we must
look to the legislatures to determine and give expression to public
policy and opinion.
or any person seeking employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter
into any agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or remain a member
of any labor corporation, association, or organization; or shall threaten, any
employee with loss of employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any
employee because of his membership in such a labor corporation, association or
organization." Act of June i, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 428); Calif. Pen. Code, i9o3,
ch. i6, sec. 679; Colo. Rev. Sts. i9oS, ch. 79, secs. 3925, 3926;, Conn. Gen. Sts.
192, ch. 86, sec. 1297; 3 N. Y. Cons. Laws igog, ch. 48, sec. 531; 2 N. J. Gen.
Sts. 1895, 19o5.
"Adair v. United States (I90g8) 2o8 U. S. 16i, z8 Sup. Ct. 277 (federal statute
held to be an invasion of the personal liberty and right of property guaranteed
by the 5th Amendment)'; Gillkspie v. People (igoo) 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1oo7;
People v. Marcus (i9o6) 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. lO73; see discussion by Richard
Olney, Discrimination against Union Labor-Legal? (igog) 42 Amna. L. REv. 161.
-I Mass. Rev. Laws 19o2, ch, I66, sec. ii; Ala. Cr. Code 1907, ch. 176, sec. 6397,-
3 N. Y. Cons. Laws 19og, ch. 48, sec. 530; Jones v. Gin Wks. (i~o8) 131 Ga. 336,
62 S. E.'236; Carter v. Oster (I90o8) 134 Mo. App. 146, 112 S. W. 995- State v.
Stockford (1904) 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769; Mass. Rev. Laws 19o2, ch. Io6,
sec. ii.-
'Utah Comp. Laws, i9o7, ch. 53, sec. 4487 x ii; Ala. Cr. Code i9o7, ch. 211, sec.
6856; State v. McGee (i9o8) 8o Conn; 614, 69 Atl. io59; Schultz v. State (19o8)
135 Wis. 644, 114 N. W. 505.
10N. D. Pen. Code 1913, ch. 7, sec. 9445.
Hurd's Rev. Sts. Ill. I919, ch. 38, sec. 46; Ala. Cr. Code, i9O7, ch. 176, sec.
6396; Colo. Rev. Sts. i9o8, ch. 15, see. 398; United States v. Raish (1908, S. D.
Ill.) 163 Fed. gii (use of mails to boycott).
"
2 Ala. Cr. Code, i9o7, ch. 176, sec. 6395.
"Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council (i92o, Ore.) 192 Pac. 765. The diffi-
culty involved in statutes of this kind is to determine what constitutes "peaceful
picketing." See Truax v. Corrigan (1918) 2o Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 57o.
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There is one kind of legislation-the anti-trust acts-which has
assumed peculiar importance in labor disputes and which in this par-
ticular is the object of considerable attack at the present time. ,These
acts were of course originally designed to combat the large combi-
nations of capital, but were so framed as to require the courts to hold
that they apply to labor unions as well. Probably the best known
of these, and the model for many later -state enactments, is the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act,14 which provides that "every contract, combination in
"the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
'ecommerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
"declared to be illegal." The unious have been making a constant
fight to have it determined they are not subject to this legislation, and,
indeed, hailed the Clayton Act' 5 as affording the desired protection.
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, however,
showed this assumption to be erroneQus. 16 It is indeed doubtful
whether an amendment exempting labor unions or any other special
class from the operation of the Act would not be unconstitutional."
Another matter which is in a state of uncertainty at the present time
is the extent to which the use of writs of injunction shall be allowed
in labor disputes. There seems to be a determined effort to limit such
use.' Several states have enacted legislation to restrict "government
"by injunction," and it was also commonly believed that the Clayton
Act was designed to accomplish this purpose. Such legislation, how-
ever, has not effectually prevented the, courts from continuing to grant
injunctions, and this evil, if it is one, still exists.' 9 Obviously this
"' July 2, I8go (26 Stat. at L. 2o9). This was held to apply to labor unions in
the case of Loewe v. Lawlor (I9o8) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 3o1, aff. in (1915)
235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 17o. A collection of the state statutes is to be found
in Cooke, Combinations, Monopolies and Labor Unions (2d ed. i9og) 384 ff.
See Reihing v. Local Union (192o, N. J.) io9 Atl. 367; Webb v. Cooks' Union
(i9x8, Tex.) 205 S. W. 465.
"Oct. I5, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 73o). A recent statute in Wisconsin expressly
states that labor organizations shall not "be held or construed to be illegal com-
binations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws. The
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." Wis. Laws
1919, ch. 211.
"Duplex Printing Co. v.-Deering (192) 41 Sup. Ct. 172.
" Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell (igoi, 'D. Neb.) iio Fed. 816 (Nebraska
statute held to be unconstitutional) ; cf. Rohlf v. Kasemeier (i9o8) 14o Iowa,
182, 118 N. W. 276; People v. Butler Foundry (i9o3) 2o1 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349.
"Wash. Laws, igig ch. 185; Ore. Laws, .igig, ch. 346, applied in Greenfield v.
Central Labor Council (92o, Ore.) 192 Pac. 783.
"'In Goldberg v. Stablemen's Union (19o6) 149 Calif. 429, 86 Pac. 8o6, the
court said: "The section of an act of the legislature there referred to, is some-
what difficult of construction; but, in the first place; it cannot, in our opinion,
be construed as undertaking to prohibit a court from enjoining the main wrong-
ful acts charged in the complaint in this action; and, in the second place, if it
could be so construed, it would to that extent be void because violative of
plaintiff's constitutional right to acquire, possess, enjoy and protect property."
It is interesting to note how well this fits in with the Massachusetts idea, when
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question is far from settled, and a prediction as to its solution would
be futile.
Probably the labor legislation of greatest interest in the United
States today is the Kansas Industrial Court Act. This marks a de-
parture from the customary field of legislation in this country, and the
result is being observed with great interest. Kansas has been the first
state of the Union to take advantage of the experiments in compulsory
arbitration in New Zealand and other countries and to make a real
attempt to take control of the situation when there is industrial unrest.
The extent of our legislation before this has been to provide boards of
mediation and conciliation, etc., their duty being to investigate labor
disputes and to attempt to bring about industrial peace by arbitration
wherever possible.20  No comment seems necessary on the results
obtained by these boards, other than to point out that it is well realized
that in our system of law these expedients have not met the situation,
and that, despite such boards of conciliation, a strike, as such, is today
more or less uncontrolled by law. It is hoped that the Kansas Act
may point the way to that much talked of ideal, industrial peace.21
Very little mention has been made thus far in these comments of the
English law governing trade disputes, the discussion having been
intentionally confined as far as possible to the American decisions.
Undoubtedly, of course, several well-known English cases22 have
exerted a great influence on American decisions and have become almost
classics on this subject. The law as to labor disputes in England is
now generally governed by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property
ordinarily these two courts are quite divergent in their interpretation of labor
law. In Bogni v. Perotti (1916) 224 Mass. 152, I12 N. E. 853 it was stated that
"the right to work, therefore, is property. One cannot be deprived of it by
simple mandate of the Legislature. It is protected by the Fourteenth Ameridment
to -the Constitution of the United States and by numerous guaranties of our
Constitution. It is as much property as the more obvious forms of goods and
merchandise, stocks and bonds. That it may be also a part of the liberty of the
citizen does not affect its character as property." But see dissenting opinion of
Bennett, J., in Heitkemper *v. Central Labor Council, supra note 13. See Noras
(2917) 1 MiNN. L. REV. 71. For a discussion of the Duplex Printing Co. case,
supra note 15, see (2922) 19 MicH. L. REV. 628; see also Buyer v. Guillan (Feb. 2,
192i) U. S. C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term, ig2o, No. 154; Monday Co. v. Automobile
Local (192o, Wis.) 177 N. W. 867. For a different conception of the constitu-
tional guaranties and the "right to work," see Pound, Liberty of Contract (igog)
I8 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 454.
Conn. Gen. Sts. i9o2, ch. 273, secs. 47o8-13; Hurd's Rev. Sts. IIl., 19o5, ch. o;
Mass. Rev. Laws, igo2, ch. io6 (amended by Acts of 194o, chs. 313, 399); Minn.
Gen. Sts. 1913, ch. 23, sec. 394o; 3 N. Y. Cons. Laws, igo9, ch. 36, secs. i4o-8;
Pa. Laws, 1913, ch. 267; Wis. Laws, i91'1, ch. 485. A collection of these statutes
may be found in 7 Labatt, Master and Servant (913) 8587-86Ol.
"1 Young, Industrial Courts; with Special References to the' Kansas Experi-
ment (1920) 4 MINN. L. REv. 483, (1920-21) 5 MINN. L. REV. 39, 185, 353; Vance,
The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations (I92I) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 456.
2Lumley v. Gye (2853, Q. B.) 2 Ell. & Black. 2i6; Allen v. Flood [1898, H. L.]
A. C. I; Quinn v. Leathem [igoi, H. L.] A. C. 495.
COMMENTS
Act, 1875,23 and the Trades Disputes Act, 19o6.24 It seems that, as
in America, the determining factor as to the legality of a strike is that
of a justifiable obj~ct.25 Naturally the English law also adopts the
sound policy that any resort to violence or force is illegal.26  Union
workmen may lawfully refuse to 'work with a non-union workman,
and thus enforce the closed shop.27  Picketing if peaceful is permis-
sible, by statute.28  Thus, in general,- the English law has adopted.
principles fundamentally in accord with the rules established in this
dountry, and, indeed, is more consistent with such rules than the deci-
sions of some of our own courts. Due to the provisions of the Trades
Disputes Act, however, the English courts are disposed to be more
liberal with the labor unions, and the doctrine of justification is ex-
tended further than in the United States.
Practically all the remaining parts of the English-speaking world
have some form of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. Thus
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have arbitration laws which have
been in operation for several years and which- may lead to an adjust-
ment of all industrial disputes on a rational basis. 29  Truly they are
experiments of great interest to the rest of the world and ones which
at least recognize the fact that the state must be supreme in matters
of this kind and that industrial warfare is a thing to be outlawed. It
2, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86.
246 Edw. VII, c. 47.
"The legalty of using threats in the interest of its members by a trade union
had been repeatedly considered. The authorities showed that the question was in
each case whether what the defendants threatened to do was an actionable wrong.
Had they a just cause or a reasonable excuse for doing what they did? He came
to the conclusion that what the defendants here had done was done with a bona
fide desire to further the interests of their members. If so, they had taken no
unlawful means to carry out what was a perfectly legitimate object." Wake v.
Motor Trade Association (i92o, C. A.) 65 SOL. JoUR. 239.
" "Hi must prove that in order to procure their object they. have resorted to
threats, coercion, or other illegal means. Inducement not to continue an employ-
ment is illegal only if it is exercised by the use of illegal means . . .Can a simple
notification to the employer of an infention to do.a lawful act or lawful acts,
whether it be a notification on behalf of an individual or on behalf of a number
of persons, properly be described as the use of illegal means against the plaintiff?
I do not think it can." Wolstenholnme v. Ariss [192o] 2 Ch. 403. One of the
provisions of the Trades Disputes Act (see. 3) is to.the effect that interference
by a union with a contract of service shall not be actionable.
" Wolstenhotme v. Ariss, supra note 26; Hodges v. Webb [192o] 2 Ch. 70;
White v. Riley [i92i] I Ch. I.
' "This statute [Trades Disputes Act] might well be termed a codification of
the law relating to peaceful picketing as laid down by a majority of the American
courts."--Martin, Modern Law of Labor Unions (igio) 241.
'For the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, arbitration laws, see 7 Labatt,
op. cit., 86oi-862I. See also Riddell, Labor Legislation in Canada (I92O-2i) 5.
MINN. L. REv. 83, 243; Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (915)
29 HARv. L. REv. 13, (igi8) 32 id. 18g, (1920) 34 id. 1O5.
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is also interesting to note that Denmark has recently enacted somewhat
similar legislation. 0 It has established a system of independent courts
to deal with labor disputes, but, curiously enough, left the selection of
judges to private organizations. This is certainly a departure from
the usual course of procedure, involving as it does the court of highest
instance within a particular field.
It is evident that the courts have been unable to bring about indus-
trial peace in this country. There is some possibility that labor and
capital will settle their differences without requiring outside interven-
tion. The prevalent view, however, appears to be that the remedy
must come through the legislatures. Probably the natural course for
them to take will be in the direction of compulsory arbitration. The
Kansas experiment may be the entering wedge, or it may show the
impracticability of such a course. 8' There undoubtedly is a solution
to this problem, and it is to be hoped that the legislatures will make
a serious effort to discover it. Certainly it would be a sinister con-
fession of weakness if a democracy were to admit that it could devise
no means to control and put an end to private warfare between two
such large groups of its citizens.
JUDGMENT OR SATISFACTION AS PASSING TITLE
"The controversy whether the title to a converted chattel vests in a
defendant by simple judgment, or only after the satisfaction of thejudgment, is, therefore, but another battle of the knights over the gold
and silver shield. Under some circumstances the title changes by thejudgment alone; in other cases satisfaction is necessary to produce
that result."'-
Such was the conclusion of Ames on the mooted question whether,
in an action for conversion, the mere entry of a judgment for the
value of the converted chattel, or the payment of the judgment, passed
the title of the chattel to the converter. The early cases stated that
title passed by the judgment.2  It has long been the fashion, however,
to say that, not the judgment, but only satisfaction of it passes the'
" The Danish Labor Court, (Dec. 9, i92o) Industrial Information Service 3-6.
"t This and other measures will be taken up in a further comment.
"Ames, The Nature of Ownership (1890) 3 HARv. L. REv. 23, 313, 327, 3 Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (ig..) 561, 578, Lectures in Legal
History (1913) 209.
'Adams v. Broughton (0708, K. B.) 2 Strange, 1077; Smith v. Gibson (1737,
K. B.) i Cas. T. Hardw. 319; Brown v. Wotton, (i6o6, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 73,
Yelv. 67, Moore, 762; Bishop v. Montague,"(i6oi, C. P.) Cro. Eliz. 824. See also
Buckland v. Johnson (1854, C. P.) 15 C. B. 145; Cboper v. Shepherd (1846, C. P.)
3 C. B. 265; note to Bennett v. Brandao (i843,,C. P.) 6 Man. & Grang. 630, 640;
Kitch n v. Campbell (1772, C. P.) 3 Wils. 304, 309, 2 Win. Black 779, 827; see
also discussion of the earlier cases in Brinsmead v. Harrison (1871) L. R. 6 C. P.
584, (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 547. For cases in the Year Bool s see note 5, infra,
and cf. Keil. 58b.
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title.3 Thus the court in Decker v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co.
(i92o, Wis.) i8o N. W. 256, states that, by the "great weight of
authority", it is only the satisfaction of the judgment which, by law,
divests the original owner of his title. Much of the difficulty and much,
though not all, of the conflict in the cases comes from the use of the
uncertain and indefinite term "title" to express varying legal situations
for which a closer definition is desirable. "Title" is a concept of 'much
agility. Generally, when it appears, we find in it a tendency to flit here
and there with a suddenness which is surprising, and hence we should
not be surprised to find it possessing these characteristics in the situation
under discussion.4  The confusion comes from the fact that title is
applied to an aggregate-a "bundle"-of legal relations, and we find
the term used indiscriminately to indicate a bundle of various sizes.
Thus, if the term means the passing of all legal interest in the chattel
from the original owner, title does not pass until satisfaction of the
judgment; if, however, it means the passing of some interest from the
owner, it passes at least on judgment, if not before.5 Although Ames
adhered to the traditional term "title", he had this distinction clearly
in mind in the passage quoted above, where he suggests that some
'Brinsinead v.. Harrison, supra note 2; Atwater v. Tupper (1877) 45 Conn.
144; Miller v. Hyde (1894) 161 Mass. 472, 37 N. E. 76o; Tolman Co. v. Waite
(1899) 199 Mich. 341, 78 N. W. 124; Russell v. McCall (1894) 341 N. Y. 437,
36 N. E. 498; see also 2 Kent, Commentaries, *388. See cases collected in 15
Ann. Cas. 454, note, 26 R. C. L. 1157, 38, Cyc. 2112. In 38 Cyc. 2112, many cases
are cited as holding in accord with the old rule. Most of them may be dis-
tinguished as pointed out in this comment. In accord with the former rule,
however, see Hydi v. Kiehl (i898) 183 Pa. 4-4, 38 Atl. 998; Merrick's Estate
(1842, Pa.) 5 W. & S. 9, 17; Wilburn v. Bogan (1842, S. C.) i Spear, 179;
Murrell v. Johnson's Administrator (38o7, Va.) I H. & M. 449; and cf. Par-
reenter v. Barstow (1899) 21 R. I. 430, 43 Ati 3O35.
" See Corbin, What is a Transfer of Title (i92o) 29 YAIE LAw JOURNAL, 429;
also, as to the somewhat similar term "own," cf. Cook, Hohfeld's Contribution
to the Law (3939) 28 id. 72r, 725.
'The language of the cases in the Year Books on election of remedies-
"disseisin by election"-indicates that the election to divest the property out of
oneself was made by the bringing of the action. (344o), Y. B. 19 Hen. VI, p. 65,
pl. 5; (1462) Y. B. 2 Edw. IV, p. 16, pl. 8; (i4o5) Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, p. 8, pl. 4.
Compare as to realty, Co. Lit. 323 b, and see Holmes, J., dissenting, in Miller v.
Hyde, supra note 3; see also Bordwell, Property in the Trespasser (19x6) 29
H.xv. L. REV. 374, 385. This was the view of Anderson and Warburton, JJ., in
Bishop v. Montague, supra note 2; cf. cases in note 2, supra. Yet since a non-
suit was and is so freely permitted and is no bar in another suit the question
should not be of importance. See Co. Lit. 139 a; Outhwaite v. Hudson (1852)
7 Exch. 380; Bacon Abr. tit, Non-Suit: 18 C. J. 153, 1171. As Holmes says,
in Miller v. Hyde, supra note 3, "An election is determined by judgment." There
are, however, cases holding that the election is finally and conclusively made by
the bringing of the suit. Ireland v. Waymire (192o, Kan.) 191 Pac. 304, criticised
in (192o) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2o6, citing Keener, Quai-Contracts (x893)
203-213; Corbin, Waiver of Tort (1gio) 19 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 221, 239; (1919)
28 id. 4o9. In Brown v. Wootton, supra note 2, the court treated the judgment
rather as res judicata than as an election.
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interest passes on judgment and the rest on satisfaction. In fact, he
gives a new twist to the term, showing it to be a variable thing,
while the usual fallacy is to use it in the belief that it means a fixed and
certain thihg. The real issue therefore is, to ascertain just how much
of a legal interest passed from owner to converter at each stage of the
proceedings.
Even by the conversion the converter has bettered his legal position
somewhat with respect to the chattel, for, by the more generar rule, he
gets "title as against all The world except the true owner" and those
claiming under the true owner, i.e., he may sue or defend on the strength
of his possession.6 But since disseisin of chattels does not carry.as inl-
portant results from the standpoint of remedial relief as did the old dis-
seisin of realty, 7 the converter has acquired as against the true owner
little more than a liability to a judgment of some kind. Suppose such
judgment to be entered. If it is for the redelivery of the chattel, obvi-
ously "title" has not passed, that is, the converter has acquired no further
legal interest in the chattel. If it is for the value of the chattel, has a
further legal interest been acquired? In one respect at least, there has,
since a former judgment may be pleaded under the doctrine that no one
is to be sued twice for the same wrong. After a judgment for the
value of the chattel, the original owner can no longer sue the converter
for the chattel itself or for its value. Trespass, trover, implied
assumpsit, detinue, and, it seems, replevin, or their descendants
under the codes, all are barred by the judgment in trover5 The con-
verter is immune from suit and thus has approached-complete 'owner-
ship. What does he lack?
Before attempting an answer to this question, it may be well to state
'By the weight of authority title in a third party is not a defense to an action
for conversion, unless the defendant connects himself with such title. See cases
collected, 38 Cyc. 2o62; 26 R. C. L. 1141.
'See Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin (1921) 34 H.4Av. L. REv. 592, 604, 6o9;
and see also articles by Bordwell, supra note 5, and Ames, supra note i.
'Nemo bis vexari debet pI-o eadem causa. Kitchen v. Campbell, supra note z;
Smith v: Gibson, supra note z; Ferrer's Case (I598, C. P.) Coke, Pt. 6, 7a;Singer & Co. v. Yaduski (19o2) ii Pa. Dist. Rep. 57,; Rembert v. Hally (185o,
Tenn.) io Humph. 513; Lacon v. Barnard (1627, C. P.) Cro. Car. 35; Wooley v.
Carter (1823, N. J. L.) 2 Halst. 45; Lovejoy v. Wallace (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall.
i, i; Rauer v. Rynd (i9r5) 27 Calif. App. 556, 15o Pac. 78o; Mead v. Mead(1911) 115 Minn. 524, 132 N. W. 1132; Smith v. Clark (1909) 37 Utah, 116, io6
Pac. 653, 26 L. R. A. (x. s.) 281, note; Oliver v. Grand Ronde Grain Co. (1914)
72 Ore. 46, 142 Pac. 541. See cases collected 23 Cyc. 1321. The judgment must
of course be for the value of the chattel anid not merely damages for the taking,
i. e., the issue must be the same. Lacon v. Barnard, supra. It might be thought
that the unpaid plaintiff should still have replevin. While the authority is scanty,
this does not seem to be true. Cf. Rauer v. Rynd, supra; Mead v. Mead, supra.And if it were, we should have this dilemma, that the plaintiff would be-entitled
to possession notwithstanding the judgment in trover, and if defendant refused
to give up possession on demand he would be guilty of conversion and then
trover would again lie I
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another point as to which the courts are coming more and more into
general agreement: It is a general principle of the law of torts that a
judgment against ond of two joint tort-feasors is no bar to a suit
against the other until the judgment is -satisfied2" Unlike the rule
against double vexation, there is no socially desirable principle that a
man should be relieved of his tort by the mere entry of a judgment,
which has not been paid, against another. So, in accord with this
principle, we find many cases allowing successive suits against joint
converters or against successive converters brought before the first
judgment for the value of the chattel.1 In fact almost all of the cases
involve this point, and, while the rule of law will be stated broadly that
satisfaction is necessary to the passing of title, actually it will be only a
case of a joint wrong or of a conversion from the converter."' Such
was the actual decision in Decker v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co.,
supra, .where a factor had wrongfully transferred the plaintiff's goods
to the cold storage company. It was held that an unsatisfied judgment
for conversion against the factor did not bar replevin by the owners
against the storage company. Each case it cites to show the "great
weight of authority" presents only an analogous situation and not a
case where one is claiming by transfer from the judgment debtor after
the judgment.
Hence we see that joint or successive converters may be sued until
satisfaction is obtained, while the mere entry of judgment gives an
immunity from suit to the defendant converter who is sued. What is
the position of those who take from the converter after judgment?
Ames suggested acutely,12 and his suggestion has been adopted by
learned commentators,'1 3 that the answer to this question should depend
upon who has possession at the time of the judgment. If the converter
has possession at the time of the judgment, "the converter's possession,
"being thus set free from adverse claims, changes into ownership," and
subsequent possessors are protected; whereas, if there is a change of
possession before judgment'against the converter, the new possessor
'That judgment against one of two joint tort-feasors without satisfaction is no
bar to a suit against the other-the usual rule in America-see Livingston v. Bishop
(i8o6, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) I Johns. 29o; Litchfield v. Goodnow (1887) 123 U. S. 549,
8 Sup. Ct. 21o; Lumber Co. v. Bah'ks (19o7) 118 Tenn. 627, 102 S. W. 79; but
see contra, Petticolas v. Richmond (1897) 95 Va. 456, 28 S. E. 566; and Brins-
mead v. Harrison, supra note 2, (criticised by Ames, op. cit. note i). For cases
collected see 23 Cyc. 1212.
"Such were the cases in note 3 .upra. Thus in Miller v. Hyde there were
successive conversions, and in Atwater v. Tupper there was a joint conversion.
See also Matthews v. Menedger (1840, C. C. 7th) 2 McLean, 145; Sharp 'v. Gray
(1844, Ky.) 5 B. Mon. 4; Hopkins v. Hersey (1841) 20 Me. 449; McGee v.
Overley (I85I), 12 Ark. 164; Dow v. King (1889) 52 Ark..282, 12 S. W. 577;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Skillman (189o) 52 N. J. L. 263, ig Atl. 260.
"1 Cf. cases in notes 3 and io supra.
"Ames, op. cit., note i.
" See NoTEs (1902) I6 HARV. L. REv. 131.
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is not so protected. On the surface' at least there seems to be no logical
sequence from cause to result. Is it, as Ames suggests, analogous to
the running of the statute of limitations where "possession ripens into
"ownership?" There is a certain analogy, it is true, but it is believed
that the reason for the' rule suggested by Ames goes deeper. It is
simply an application of the rule against double vexation to allow the
taker from the judgment debtor to be in as good a position as the
debtor is and. to have a like immunity from suit. Hence under this
view neither the converter nor those claimiuig under him after the
judgment, i. e., in privity with him, may be sued.Y But suit may be
brought against all others not occupying this favored position.1 5 Or,
as is so often expressed, judgments bind parties thereto and their
privies, and as those claiming under the converter after the judgment
are in privity with him, the judgment is binding upon them and in their
favor.'
Our sympathies for the unpaid plaintiff may lead us to object to this
view, but it is thought that from the standpoint of reason and justice
there is much to be said for it. If the converter finds that his judgment
does not enable him to sell the chattel with any degree of safety, his
immunity from another suit is of indifferent value. This may not
cause us discomfort, since with an unsatisfied judgment against him
he is not in a position to make any particular appeal to our sympathies.
And the rule* against double vexation is probably only partly for his
protection, for the courts themselves need some protection and this is a
device to prevent litigation from lasting forever.'7 'But the position
of the taker from the converter is more appealing. Acting subsequent
to a judgment for the value of the chattel, and quite probably upon
' For good discussion see Barb v. Fish (1847, Ind.) 8 Blackf. 481, 485; 'see also
0844) 3 AmER. L. MAG. 49, infra note 18. A creditor of the converter may
take the chattel on execution against the converter. Rogers v. Moore (1838,
S. C.) Rice, 6o; Norrill v. Corley (1828, S. C.) 2 Rich. Eq. .288; Fornman v.
Nielson (1846, S. C.) 2 Rich. Eq. 387; Norris v. Beckley (1818, S. C.) 2 Const.
Rep. ,228; but cf. Bush v. Bush (1847, S. C.) i Strob. Eq. 377. In Eckert v.
Truman (I914). 163 App. Div. 17, 148 N. Y. Supp. 48, it was said that while
satisfaction of a judgment for conversion was necessary for the passage of title,
"still the act of suing for conversion did change plaintiff's position," and he was
no longer entitled to possession of the chattel. Hence the converter and her
sor to whom she claimed to have sold the chattel were not guilty of contimpt
of court in refusing to deliver it over to the plaintiff. For a somewhat similar
situation, 6ee Deitz v. Field (1896) io App. Div. 425, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1087; but
see Union Pac. Ry. v. Schiff .(1897, S. D. N. Y.) 78 Fed. 216, (1898, C. C. A. 2d)
86 Fed. 1023.
"'As above noted, the usual case is that of the joint wrong-doer. See notes 3,
1O, and ii supra. As to those who take from or dispossess, the converter prior
to judgment, see Morris v. Robinson (1824, K. B.) 3 Barn. & Cres. 196.
"
8Lovejoy v. Murray (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall. I, 18; Litchfield v. Goodnow, supra
note 9; 23 Cyc. 1227, 1253, 1259.
" See remarks in Ferrer's Case, Kitchen v. Campbell, and the other cases cited
in note 8 supra, especially Lovejoy v. Murray, supra note 16, at 1p. 19.
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faith of it, he surely is more deerving of protection than the man who
has had his election of. remedies and has taken his choice, who has
chosen to pursue that course which he thought would bring him the
most advantage, and who, moreover, has had the opportunity of enforc-
ing his judgment by levying execution on the chattel itself while it was
in the converter's hands. There is some support for this view in the
cases, but there are few direct precedents on the point and they are not
harmonious. Some of the cases cited by Ames fail to support his
position. The issue is obscured by the general statement that "title"
passes at one time or another."8 But the cases which do not afford
protection by the judgment to those claiming under the judgment
debtor surely reach an anomalous result, for the converter-perhaps an
intentional and malicious wrong-doer-is no longer subject to a suit,
while his innocent victims are. Some way should be sought in the
event of such a holding, to avoid the ruling that the initial converter
cannot again be sued. Perhaps it might be said that the action result-
ing in the judgment put in issue the title but not the immediate right
to possession, which could be sued upon in a subsequent action of
replevin. Yet this seems unsound, for the action does put in issue
also the question of possession.1 9  Ames' view that one claiming under
the judgment debtor by a transfer after judgment is protected would
appear to be the sounder. Moreover, it avoids another anomaly, that
of shielding the hardened converter who knows the law, for he will
either not attempt to sell the chattel concerned in the judgment or will
pick his victim with care before he vanishes. Any unexpected rule of
law-any rule opposed to ordinary business practice-puts him who
has had experience with it and knowledge of it at an advantage over
"Only in Barb v. Fish, supra note x4, does there seem to be an appreciation
of the point that title included many legal relations, not all of which change
at any one time. Ames' position is in general supported by the cases cited in
note 14, though some of them speak of the judgment as passing title, i. e., the
old common-law rule. As contra, should probably be stated cases where it 
is
said that satisfaction is necessary, and no point is made whether the defendant
claims under and subsequent to the former judgment or not. Ledbetter v.
Embree (895) 12 Ind. App. 617, 40 N. E. 920; Spivey v. Morris (i856) i8 Ala.
254; Osterhout v. Roberts (1827, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 8 Cow. 43; Goff v. Craven
(x884, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 34 Hun,.i5o (see criticism by Ames, op. cit. note i). In
Spivey v. Morris and Osterhout v. Roberts, however, the defendant did not show
himself in privity with the judgment debtor after the judgment and hence the
cases are merely siinilar to those in notes 3 and IO supra. In an interesting
article, Transfer of Personal Property by Judgment (i844) 3 AMTER. L. MAG. 49
the conclusion is reached "that a judgment in trespass or trover without satis-
faction will not transfer the title to the defendant, though such judgment is
pleadable in bar to any action by the same plaintiff and his privies, against the
same defendant and his privies."
" See note 8, supra. The crux of the matter is here, for surely we should not
wish to treat the converter more gently than his transferee. Those who 
would
favor the unpaid plaintiff should attack, therefore, the whole rule of the binding
force of former judgments.
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the ordinary innocent law-abiding citizen, and this is thought to be
such a rule.
2 0
Should the converter secure from the judgment also an immunity
from self-help, i. e., from a retaking of the chattel by the owner? An
English case held that the owner might himself retake his chattel from
the converter in spite of a judgment for its value in his favor .2 1  This
does not conflict with our rules of policy suggested above, but it may
be questioned how far, in view of the desirability of avoiding freefights, self-help should be available when court aid is not. It has
been held in New Hampshire that a retaking by the owner after judg-
ment but before satisfaction makes the owner liable in trover to the
converter after the latter has paid the judgment. 2 2  This result seems
preferable, though it is placed on the fiction-unnecessary under Ames'
reasonig-of "title relating back" to the conversion or the judgment
when satisfaction is at length made.23
Decker v. Milwaukee Cold Storage Co., therefore, states only the
ordinary rule applicable to joint or successive converters. To explain
the decision in terms of the passage of title does not solve more difficult
questions with which the court may be confronted in the future. It
may then be desirable to point out that, while joint or successive wrong-
doers are not protected by a bare judgment against one of their number,
yet such a judgment will be protection both to those.who are parties to
it and to those who claim under parties to it.
C. E.C.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT WHO REFUSES TO OBTAIN MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR SICK CHILD
The increasing number of persons whose religious belief discounte-
nances the use of medicine in the treatment of disease gives considerable
importance to the interesting legal questions which arise when a parent,
because of religious conviction, fails to provide medical attention forhis sick child. Two fairly recent cases have expressed opposite views
20 It might be claimed that only those who purchase from the judgment debtor
should be entitled to the protection of his judgment. It is thought, however, that
the reasons suggested in the text are strong enough to justify protection for anykind of a taker from the converter after a judgment against the latter. Only
then can the converter's immunity from further suit-except on the judgment
debt-be made practically complete and effective.
'Ex parte Drake (1877) L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 866.
"Smith v. Smith (1872) 51 N. H. 571; cf. Greer v. Lafayette County Bank(1898, Tex. Civ. App.) 47 S. W. 737; Acheson v. Miller (1853) 2 Oh. St. 2o3.
' The same rule applies to increase of the chattel prior to satisfaction. Hep-burn v. Sewell (1821, Md.) 5 H. & J. 211; White v. Martin (1834, Ala.) I Port.215. The doctrine of relation is criticised by Holmes in Miller v. Hyde, supra
note 3, and by Ames, op. cit. note I. In Bacon v. Kummel (1866) 14 Mich. 2o,it was held not to apply so as to make an otherwise rightful act a trespass.Cf. Third Nat'l Bank v. Rice (19o8, C. C. A. 8th) 161 Fed. 822, 15 Ann. Cas.
450, note.
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of the parent's criminal responsibility in case such lack of treatment
results in the child's death.
In Bradley v. State (1920, Fla.) 84 So. 677, it appeared that the
defendant's daughter, under sixteen years of age, in an epileptic par-
oxysm fell unconscious into a fire and was severely burned. The de-
fendant believed in divine healing by prayer and refused to summon
or to permit others to summon a physician to attend the child, although
according to the testimony of. a witness who saw her two weeks after
the accident she was suffering intensely. After remaining more than
four weeks at the defendant's home without other treatment than
prayer, the child was sent to the State Hospital for the Insane, where
she received treatment from physicians. Three weeks later she died.
The physicians testified that her death resulted from the burn and that
in their opinion she would have recovered if she had received medical
attention promptly after the accident. The father was convicted of
manslaughter under a statute which defined this crime as "the killing
"of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of
"another." This conviction was reversed by a divided court, the major-
ity opinion stating that "the general definition of manslaughter con-
"tained in the statute does not appear to cover a case of this nature."1
On the other hand, in State v. Barnes (1919) 141 Tenn. 469, 212
S. W. ioo, where the defendant was indicted for wilfully and without
good cause failing to provide.for his minor child by suffering the child
to sicken and die without proper care and medical attention, the court
said:
"It is the legal duty of the father to provide 'proper care, treatment
'and medical attention' for his child. . . . If by reason of his breach of
this duty the death of this child resulted, we think the father may be
guilty of homicide."
Before proceeding to discuss the main problem, namely, whether
failure to procure medical treatment in case of serious illness can be
deemed "culpable negligence" on the part of the parent, it may be well
to dispose of the preliminary question of the causal connection between.
such failure and the subsequent death of the child. It is elementary
that if a person is to be held criminally responsible for the death of
another, his act or failure to act must have caused, or at least have
IThe court apparently relied also upon supposed lack of causal connection
between the father's conduct and .the death of the child. Whitfield, J. at p. 679:
"Manifestly the death of the child was caused by the accidental burning in which
the father had no part. The attentions of a physician may [might] or may
[might] not have prevented the burning from causing the death of the child;
but the absence of medical attention did not cause 'the killing' of the child,
even if the failure or refusal of the father to provide medical attention was
• 'culpable negligence' within the intent of the statute."
Here the court invaded the province of the jury, it would seem. If the parent's
conduct was culpable negligence, then the question whether such negligence
caused the death is one of fact for the jury. See infra, notes 3 and 5.
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accelerated, the death of such other.2  Is medical science sufficiently
exact so that it is possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
medical treatment would have saved or prolonged the life of the
deceased, or, in other words, that failure to provide it caused or accel-
erated the death? Browne, C. J., in the Florida case believes that this
question must be answered in the negative." While it is not sufficient
for physicians to testify merely that the sick person's life might prob-
ably have been prolonged by medical treatment, 4 positive expert opinion
that his life would have been prolonged is accepted by the overwhelming
weight of authority as competent evidence to sustain a jury's verdict
that lack of such treatment did in fact cause or accelerate the death. 5
Expert medical testimony that a blow or a poison caused death in a
given case is accepted without question; yet such testimony is only a
conclusion of the witness based upon experience of what usually hap-
pens under similar circumstances. A competent physician's opinion
that a given disease or a burn would have been cured by certain medical
treatment, because experience in a large number of similar cases has
shown that such cures have been effected, is no less credible and con-
vincing to a great majority of the community, even though there be
a considerable number who disbelieve in the efficacy of medicine.
Assuming, then, that competent evidence convinces the jury that
medical treatment would have saved or prolonged the child's life, the
problem remains whether a parent who fails to supply it because of an
honest disbelief in its efficacy, should be held guilty of manslaughter.
That "criminal negligence" may take the place of evil intent and supply
the mens rea commonly said to be necessary to establish guilt of man-
slaughter needs no argument.6 The precise question, therefore, is
'Reg. v. Mor6y (1882) 15 Cox C. C. 35; Rex v. Instan [893] i .Q. B. 450;
State v. Lowe (1896) 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. W. io94; Commonwealth v. Hoffman
(igo3) 29 Pa. Co. Ct. 65, 70.
'Browne, C. J., in his concurring opinion says: "The fallacy of this [the state's
case] is that it was not proven, and was not capable of being proven, that if the
child had had medical attention it would have recovered. And that must always
be the fallacy in an attempt to attach the guilt. of manslaughter to a father for
failing to call a physician whenever his child is sick, if it subsequently dies."
See also note i, supra.
It is believed that Bradley v. State stands absolutely alone in the assertion that
causal connection between the death and the lack of treatment is incapable of
legal proof. Compare, note 5, infra.
'Reg. v. Morby, supra note 2.
'In Reg. v. Senior [1899] 1 Q. B. 283, the judge instructed the jury that
they must first of all be satisfied that the death of the child" had been caused or
accelerated by the want of medical attention. One of the questions reserved was
whether there was evidence upon which the jury could properly convict the
prisoner. The conviction was affirmed. See also Commonwealth v. Hoffman,
supra note 2, and the cases cited in annotations in 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 685; 45 id.
559; io A. L. R. 1137.6 1 Bishop, New Criminal Law (8th ed. 2892) secs. 33, 314.
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whether crininal negligence can exist where the parent acts from the
best of motives and, as he honestly believes, in the interest of the child.
The answer must depend upon whether the standard of conduct, de-
parture from which may constitute criminal negligeiice, shall be the
defendant's personal standard of reasonable conduct or an objective
standard based on what the average prudent citizen would deem reason-
able conduct under the circumstances. The objective standard has
been universally accepted as the basis of responsibility for negligent
torts,7 but there are conflicting views as to which standard obtains in
criminal law." Moral guilt perhaps implies a certain state of con-
sciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts. But it
is not necessarily true that only morally blameworthy acts should be
punished criminally. The chief purpose of the criminal law is to induce
conformity to certain rules of conduct believed fo be for the general
good. Consequently the standard of lawful conduct should be an ex-
ternal standard established in the interest of the community. The
standard is such that failure to conform is blameworthy in the average
member of the community. For the welfare of all, the particular indi-
vidual may be required to reach that average standard at his peril and
mayjustly be punished for failure to do so, however pure his motives
or intentionsY
That an objective standard may be imposed by legislation will
scarcely be questioned. In numerous jurisdictions the standard of
conduct required. of a parent in respect to his minor child has been
declared by statute; and statutes imposing a duty "to support,"'1 or to
supply "necessaries, ' ' i x or forbidding "wilful neglect" injurious to the
child's health'12 have been construed to require the furnishing of neces-
sary medical care and treatment; while in New York the code expressly
'See Tindal, C. J., in Vaughan v. Menlove (1837, C.'P.) 3 Bing. N. C. 468, 475:
"Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be coexten-
sive with the judgment of each iidividual, which would be as variable as the
length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which
requires in all .ases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence
would observe."
'Commonwealth v. Pierce (884) 138 Mass. 165, 176 maintains the objective
standard; State v. Schulz (x881) 55.Iowa 628, 8 N. W. 469, maintains the indi-.
vidual standard. See also (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 428; (19oz) 15 id. 500;
(I920) 6 CORN. L. QUAR. 105.
'The most effective exposition of this view has been made by Mr. Justice
Holmes in The Common Law, chap. II.
10 Owens v. State. (1911) 6 Okla. Cr. 11o, 116 Pac. 345, Ann. Cas. 1913 B, 1218,
note.
'Rex. v. Brooks (iqo2) 9 B. C. 13; Rex v. Lewis (19o3) 6 Ont. L. R. 132;
Commonwealth v. Hoffman, supra note 2; Commonwealth v. Breth (1915) 44 Pa.
*Co. Ct. 56; and see to A. L. R. 1145. note.
Compare Justice v. State (igoz) 116 Ga. 6o5, 42 S. E. ioi3, holding that "neces-
sary sustenance" does not embrace medical attention.
" Reg. v. Senior, supra note 5.
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declares the parent's duty to supply "medical attendance."'8 Of course
such legislative enactments do not contemplate the summoning of a
physician for every trifling illness. A reasonable discretion remains
vested in the parent, and the standard determining when it is necessary
to call in the services of a physician is that of the ordinarily prudent
person solicitous for the welfare and recovery of his child.14 'Where
such statutes exist and make breach of the duty a misdemeanor, the
courts have had no difficulty on familiar prindiples in holding the
parent whose failure to provide medical treatment has .caused or
hastened the child's death guilty, of manslaughter. 15  That the parent
has acted from religious conviction that, prayer was more efficient than
medicine is immaterial, except as a circumstanc4 to mitigate the severity
of the sentence to be imposed. Laws cannot interfere with religious
beliefs and opinions, but they may with practices. A contrary view
"would make the professed doctrines of religious beliefs superior to
"the law of the land and in effect permit every citizen to become a law
"unto himself."'1 6  The welfare of -the community'requfres that every-
one should submit to quarantine rules and to other health and police
regulations, whatever his personal views as to their efficacy or their
sanction in religion.
The same reasons which justify imposing by legislation an objective
standard of conduct argue persuasively for an objective standard in
drawing the line at common law between careful and, negligent conduct.
On the principle that manslaughter may be committed by the negligent
omission to perform a legal duty when such omission endangers life
and in fact results in death, 17 a parent able to supply food' s or shelter 9
"People v. Pierson (19o3) 176 N. Y. 2ol, 68 N. E. 243. Here the .prosecution
was for violation of the statute, not for manslaughter, though it would seem
that the latter charge might have been maintained.
14 This is well stated by Haight, J. in People v. Pierson, supra note 13, at p. 2o5.
See also Rex v. Lewis, supra note ii, at p. 144.
" See citations in notes. 5, 1o, Ii and 12, supra.
Section 3238 Fla. Gen. St. 19o6, provides that "any person . who shall wil-
fully deprive such child or ward of necessary medical attention, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor. , . ." Why a breach of this statutory duty, resultiig
in the. child's death, should not have been held to constitute manslaughter in
State v. Brkadley, supra, is not apparent. See State v. Staples (1914) 126 Minn.
396, 148 N. W. 283.
"Waite, C. J., in Reynolds v. United States (x878) 98 U. S. 145, 166 (prosecu-
tion for polygamy)'; see also State v. White (1886) 64 N. H. 48, 5 Atl. 828 (non-
observance of Sunday law); Commonwealth v, Breth (1915) supra note ii, at
p. 59.
'Wharton, Homicide (3d ed. i9o7) 685 et seq.
-"Reg. v. Bubb (i85) 4 Cox C. C. 455; Reg. v. Conde (1867) 10 Cox C. C.
547; Rex v. Instan, supra note 2; Lewis v. State (1883) 72 Ga. 164; State v.
Staples, supra note I5.
" See Territory v. Manton (1888) 8 Mont. 95, ig Pa6. 387; Reg. v. Brown
(1893) i Terr. L. R. 475,;I N. W. Terr. Sup. Ct. pt. 4, P. 35.
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to his helpless child and neglecting to do so is clearly guilty of this
crime if the child's death results. The common-law duty of a parent
is generally held to embrace the furnishing of necessary medical care20
as well as food and shelter. But it may be urged that the two classes
of cases are distinguishable because no sane parent can honestly be-
lieve food and shelter unnecessary to the preservation of life, while
many exemplary citizens do honestly disbelieve in the efficacy of medi-
cine.2 , This difference is immaterial, however, if the objective stand-
ard of careful conduct, be adopted. If the defendant knows that- the
child's condition is such that the average prudent and solicitous parent
would foresee danger to its life and summon medical aid, but he refuses
to do so because of his personal disbelief in medicine, his failure to
conform to the objective standard of due care. in the performance of
his duty as parent should be deemed culpable negligence. It is believed
that the weight of the small amount of legal authority which exists
favors this conclusion.
22
The health of the child is of vital interest to the State, no less than
to the parent. So long- as a majority of the citizens believe in the
efficacy of medicine there is no injustice in requiring all parents to
conform to the majority standard of careful conduct and in punishing
wilful failure to do so which results in the child's death. At present
the majority view is that prayer may be added to medical treatment,
but not substituted for it in serious illness. When, if ever, those who.
believe prayer more efficacious than medicine, shall become the majority,
then the required standard will change and parental responsibility will
be judged on a new basis. That the majority standard will not be
abused as an instrument o f persecution of the minority is evidenced
by the very small number of cases reporting criminal prosecutions in
such circumstances.
T. W. S.
"See authorities cited in the strong dissenting opinion of West, J. in Bradley
v. State, supra, at p. 68I, and in State v. Barnes, supra.
2 See Reg. v. Wagstaffe (1868) 10 Cox C. C. 530, 533.
"The English cases prior to the enactment of the statute are discussed in
Reg. v. Senior, supra note 12, Lord Russell saying, at p. 292, "I am not satisfied
that in the present case there was- not sufficient evidence, at common law, to
justify a conviction."
In Rex v. Brooks, supra note ii, the count charging breach of the common-law
duty was held sufficient, as well as the count based on the statutory duty to
provide necessaries.
The American authorities by decision or dictum favor responsibility at com-
mon law. State v. Barnes, supra; Stehr v. State (1913) 92 Neb. 755, i39*N. W.
676, 45 L. R. A. (N. s.) 559, note; State v. Staples, supra, note 15; Spead v.
Tomlinson (1904) 73 N. H. 46. 59 Atl. 376. -Contra, State v. Sandford (19o5)
99 Me. 441, 59 At. 597. It would seem that cases under: statutes which are merely
declaratory of the parents' common-law duty to supply "necessaries" are also
persuasive on the point under discussion. See citations in notes io and ixi supra.
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WHEN A WILL INTENDS AN EQUITABLE -CONVERSION
The intention of a testator is a conundrum of such peculiar fasci-
nation that the power of creating arf ambiguous future interest may be
his sole guaranty of earthly immortality; particularly if his estate is
subject to one of those eternal controversies between the life tenant
and the remainderman. In 1921 we find out from the New York Court
of Appeals in Furniss v. Cruikshank (Mar. 8) what a testator who
died in 1871 meant by his will.1 William P. Furniss created a trust of
unproductive real estate, the income payable to a life beneficiary, with
,the remainder to others. The will expressed no imperative order of
sale and declared that " all powers herein given are intended to be dis-
*"cretionary, and to be exercised or not as the executors and trustees
"should think proper." The trust fund for the life tenant was set up
in 1874, and the unproductive real estate was sold in separate lots
between 1885 and 19o2. The plaintiffs, claiming under the now de-
ceased life tenant, sued the trustees for income computed as if the land
had been sold in 1875. Reversing the decisions of the Special Term and
the Appellate Division, the New York Court of Appeals decided that
Furniss intended the proceeds, when realized, to be apportioned between
income, payable from the time of his death to the life beneficiary, and
principal belonging to the remainderman. By taking all of the circum-
stances into account, an equitable conversion was found to have been
intended, and the discretion conferred upon the trustees applied only
to the time of a sale, which itself was imperative.
The case is an interesting example of the tendency to favor the
immediate beneficiary. The crux of the question is whether an im-
perative order of sale was intended, for without it, no equitable con-
version is possible.2  To find a command to sell from surrounding
circumstances in the face of an expressed discretionary power places
.New York in a unique position on the question. 3 No court has gone as
Not yet reported. For the opinions below see (ig2o) i9r App. Div. 450, i81
N. Y. Supp. 522; (ig5, Sup. Ct.) 9o Misc. 38, 154 N. Y. Supp. 272.
' See cases collected in. 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 65, note; 6 R. C. L. 1075; Yates v.
Yates (i86o, Ch.) 28 Beav. 637; In re Coopers Estate (1903) 206 Pa. 628, 56
Atlf. 67. Where the general scheme of a will requires a conversion, the power
of sale, although not in terms imperative, operates as a conversion. Ford v. Ford
(1887) 7o Wis. 19, 33 N. W. 188; see 7 Eng. Rul. Cas. 24, 25.
'The instant case relies upon Spencer v. Spencer (i9i6) 219 N. Y. 459, 114
N. E. 849, where a trust fund was created with full power to the trustees to sell
"in their discretion, -and at such prices . . . as they may' deem proper." The
immediate precedent for Spencer v. Spencer was Lawrence v. Littlefield (1915)
215 N. Y. 561, 109 N. E. 6ii, where there was an "imperative power of sale and
an equitable conversion of the real estate into personalty at the death of the
testator." The actual will is not given. Edwards v. Edwards (i9o3) 183 Mass.
581, 67 N. E. 658, is the most nearly analogous decision in atiy other jurisdiction,
but the will contained no general discretionary clause and the court said: "It was
the duty of the trustees to convert this property into an income-producing fund."
Spencer v. Spencer, supra, apparently marks the point at which New York
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far in liberality of interpretation. But once an imperative order of sale
is found, ihe principle of the decision is clear. Where a testator gives
property to trustees with an absolute trust for conversion and a dis-
cretion as to the time at which the conversion shall take place, a delay
at the instance of the trustees should not prejudice the rights- of the
life tenant; he should have- the same benefit as if the conversion had
occurred within a reasonable time after the death of the testator,4 a
period ugually fixed at twelve months. 5 Why should the life tenant,
the child of the testator, the immediate object of his bounty, fast during
lean years so that remaindermen may feast in the remote future? The
result is one which every court would desire to reach, but which it is
believed few would have reached in the instant case.
How far does that vague phrase "superintending control," so often
used in our state constitutions to confer extraordinary powers on the
appellate court, justify interference with the action of the inferior
courts? It has been variously construed to allow the appellate court
to compel a change of venue,' to order an inferior court to go on with
a criminal proceeding when it has wrongfully quashed a coinplaint,
2
and to issue a mandamus ordering the lower tribunal to grant a creditor
an opportunity to examine an assignee.3 The power is broad and indefi-
nite, but the most liberal courts refuse to exercise it where other relief
is provided and no emergency requiring immediate action exists.
4  The
North Dakota court in the case of Lowe v. District Court (1921, N. D.)
181 N. W. 92, has gone further than would seem to be justified by its
own previous decisions or by the construction put upon the phrase by
the most liberal courts. 5  The applicant for the exercise of this power
departed from a previously settled rule. See Yates v. Yates, supra note 2, for
instance, where the testator left unimproved real estate to trustees with "absblute
discretion" of sale. Cardozo and Hogan, JJ., dissented in the instant case;
they concurred in the Spencer case.
"Sitwell v. Bernard (i8or, Ch) 6 Ves. 520, is the leading case.- Gibson v. Bott
(i802, Ch.) 7 Ves. 89; Kilvington v. Gray (1825, Ch.) 2 Sim. & Stu. 396; Walker
v. Shore (1815, Ch.) i Ves. 387; Taylor v. Clark (1841, Ch.) i Hare, 161;
Wilkinson v. Duncan (1857, Ch.) 23 Beav. 469; 6 R. C. L. xo79.
'Kilvington v. Gray, supra note.4; Taylor v. Clark, supra note 4; Sitwell v.
Bernard, supra note 4; Tucke -v. Boswell" (1843, Ch.) 5 Beav. 607; Sargent v.
Sargent (1869) iO3 Mass. 297.
'For a general discussion of the recent cases involving the exercise of this
power see 2o L..R. A. (N. s.) 9p, note.
'State, ex ret. Umbreit, v. Helms (I9o8) 136 Wis. 432, 118 N. W. i58.
'State, ex re. Fourth Nat'l Bank, v. Johnson (1899) 103 Wis. 591, 79 N. W.
I081.
"State, ex ret. Red River Brick Corp., v. District Court (1912) 24 N. D. 28,
138 N. W. 988.
"State, ex. rel. Att'y Gen., v. District Court (X904) 13 N. D. 211, 1oo N. W.
248; Long v. Kaufman Co. (igio) 127 La. 333, 53 So. 583; see alsb State, ex rel.
Bank, v. Johnson, supra note 3; State, ex rel. Red River Brick Corp., v. District
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was charged with statutory rape, and by some peculiar trick of fate
and politics, was brofight up for trial before a judge whom he had just
defeated for re-election after a bitter contest. An affidavit of prejudice
having been filed, the judge ordered a transfer to Ramsey County with-
out designating a presiding judge, as required by statute. Ramsey
County, a stronghold of the anti-Nonpartisan Leaguers, was equally
unsatisfactory to the accused, a Nonpartisan. He applied to the Su-
preme Court for the issuance of a writ to compel the transfer to
McHenry or Renville Counties. The court, without remanding the case
to the lower court to correct the irregularity in its proceedings, desig-
nated a county and. judge "to effect a speedy trial." The two dissent-
ing judges refused to recognize that the exigency of the case demanded
the exercise of this unusual power. The split in the court on political
lines would seem to indicate that the peculiar political situation in North
Dakota was an important factor in the decision.
In Tremblay v. Despatie (1921, P. C.) 37 T. L. R. 395, the issue was
finally settled as to whether the courts of the Province- of Quebec could
recognize religious impediments to marriage as grounds for annulment.
It was admitted that had the fact as to the relationship of the parties
been known to the officiating priest at the time, he could have required
a dispensation before performing the ceremony. The Privy Council
reversed the Supreme Court of Canada and held that the marfiage was
valid. Although there is practically no authority directly on the point,
the decision is in accord with what has been elsewhere accepted as the
rule, that the law will not recognize a disability of a religious char-
acter.1 It has been held that a Hindu domiciled in India could not set
up a personal disqualification for marriage outside his caste and religion
in order to impeach the validity of a marriage with an English woman
in England solemnized according to English .law.2  The decision puts
an end to any possible claims which religious authorities of any de-
nomination may have had that the courts should give religious disa-
bilities operative effect at law.
Court, supra note 4. And see also State, ex rel Anaconda Copper Co., v. District
Court (19O1).25 Mont. 504, 65 Pac. 1O2O where, by "a writ of supervisory con-
trol," the lower court was required to reverse an order that it had made allow-
ing the .inspection and survey of all underground workings of the petitioner's
mines by an adverse litigant. The order so made by the lower court was within.
its jurisdiction.
1 i6 Halsbury, Laws of England 283 (1911) sec. 524.
2 Chetti v. Chetti [i9o9] P. 67.
